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Law in Tension with Evolving Ethical Perception: Prenatal Genetic 
Testing for Sex and Disability 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Legal prohibitions are often simple responses to highly complex ethical and social 
problems. Recommendations for legal prohibition of prenatal sex-selection 
distinguish between testing for sex and for disabling conditions. This distinction 
appears to be based on an objective difference between gender and disease or 
conditions that are themselves causes of suffering. But ethical analysis reveals 
symmetry between these two cases, challenging whether the law is responding to 
differences in the nature of the test, or to social pressures against discrimination that 
are better developed with respect to sexism than is the case for disability 
discrimination. This paper argues that the strongest position against sex-selection is 
based on a rejection of the parental assessment that a person’s sex seriously 
compromises quality of life together with the dedication of social resources to 
minimize discrimination based on sex. Some genetic conditions produce disabilities 
that cannot be alleviated through improved social circumstances; the reasons for not 
restricting prenatal testing and termination as an option for parents for these 
conditions are distinguishable from those supporting prohibition of sex-selection. 
However, the severity and lack of predictability of disability associated with other 
genetic conditions are strongly contingent on social circumstances. Thus it may be 
reasonable to acknowledge that serious social reforms are required while at the 
same time supporting parental assessment of quality of life through testing and 
termination. But problems to do with the aggregate effects of individual parental 
choices, together with the need to work toward more supportive social 
circumstances, emphasize the importance of involving persons with disabilities and 
their spokespersons in evaluating social circumstances, disability discrimination, 
appropriate prenatal testing and related information to support parental decisions. 
 
Keywords:  sex-selection; disability; policy; ethics; genetics; social context 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 71, CISHE, School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University 
 2 
Introduction 
 
Legal prohibitions are often responses to complex moral issues such as 
discrimination. Any proposed policy necessarily reflects a point in time related to a 
society’s emergent discovery of how certain of its members are disadvantaged by 
attitudes and social structures. The history of legal protections against sexism and 
racism are evidence of this evolving moral perception, and this paper argues that 
restrictions on prenatal testing and termination also manifest evolving moral 
perception. But do legal prohibitions aid or inhibit the evolving moral discourse 
related to other areas of discrimination? On one hand, the entrenchment of moral 
progress in the form of prohibitions or legal rights might be seen as setting the stage 
for clarification (and perhaps precedent for further claims) of what constitutes 
discriminatory behaviour. On the other hand, prohibitions might serve primarily as 
symbolic condemnations of widely recognized discrimination that reflect and 
entrench moral sentiment at one point in time, impairing moral recognition of other 
areas of discrimination. In either case, good social policy analysis must consider the 
effects on evolving moral perceptions of enshrining contemporary views in legal 
prohibitions. Prohibiting prenatal testing and termination of fetuses of undesired sex, 
while permitting testing and termination for disabling conditions, is an example of this 
complex set of problems. 
 
In Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and mainland Europe, sex-
selection for non-medical purposes1 is widely considered wrong, and public policies 
have been implemented to restrict access (Knoppers and Isasi 2004). Arguments 
against sex-selection include: 1) that sex-selection violates duties to fetuses; 2) that 
sex-selection is discriminatory toward women and their current quality of life; 3) that 
sex-selection will reduce the opportunities for reproductive decisions; and 4) that 
being of a particular sex is not a disease or disabling condition. 
 
Although there are several possible reasons to consider sex-selection unethical, 
most of them would also justify considerable restrictions on genetic testing for 
disabling conditions. Yet it is commonly argued that parental, and particularly 
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women’s autonomy, are important grounds for permitting most types of prenatal 
genetic testing. There is some room for doubt about the soundness of prohibitions on 
sex-selection, and social policy analysis must evaluate the effect of such prohibitions 
on discrimination related to disabilities. This paper takes up the question of whether 
it is possible to substantiate a moral distinction between sex-selection and testing 
and termination for disabling conditions such as Down’s Syndrome (DS),2 in order to 
justify a restriction on the former while permitting the latter. 
 
Prenatal Genetic Testing and Sex-selection 
Prenatal genetic testing provides parents with information about the developing 
fetus, and in the case where a severe abnormality is detected, the opportunity to 
avoid their future child’s suffering by terminating the pregnancy. More generally, the 
use of prenatal testing and termination may reduce the population incidence of 
suffering due to disabling conditions, and lead to savings of resources required to 
treat, compensate or support those who are born and live with disabilities. In 
contrast, sex-selection seems to be inappropriate for prenatal genetic testing 
because sexism is a morally irrelevant category for testing unless it is associated 
with a sex-linked condition. 
 
However, this assertion requires further clarification. For instance, in agricultural 
practices, and livestock breeding in particular, sex is routinely considered an 
appropriate category for selection. There is little concern about the termination of 
particular pregnancies, the negative social aspects of selecting for a particular sex of 
animal, or its impact on the sex ratio of that breed in general. Aside from arguments 
for vegetarianism or issues of animal welfare, is it commonly held (although still 
problematic for some people) that agricultural animals do not have sufficient moral 
status to prevent their being killed (be it in utero, as an infant, or as an adult) for the 
purpose of sex-selection (or food production). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 Sex-selection can include a variety of new reproductive technologies, such as sperm sorting and 
pre-implantation diagnosis, in addition to prenatal testing and abortion.  
2 The choice of DS as a primary example may complicate issues somewhat, but a less complex 
example might bias the analysis towards thinking that evaluation of a condition’s severity is a simple 
task. Another reason to choose DS is that the frequency for testing and surveillance is very high, e.g., 
pregnant women over 35 years of age will routinely be offered triple screen testing to detect (Bassett 
et al. 2000; Mennuti 1996). 
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By analogy, to support the claim that sex-selection of human fetuses is unjustified, 
one must first determine the moral status of fetuses as meriting protection in general, 
and from sexism in particular. If fetuses are ascribed strong moral rights, e.g., 
equivalent to those given to children, then it is simply wrong to terminate the fetus, 
regardless of whether it is for reasons of sex-selection or prevention of disability. 
However, if the fetus does not have sufficient moral status to justify a strong 
protection from termination, then either there is no justification to limit parents’ 
decisions to test and terminate the pregnancy, or the justification will depend on 
some assessment of social harm of permitting sex-selection.  
 
As a matter of social policy, abortions are available in Canada without evaluation of 
the woman’s reasons as long as gestational age is below 20-24 weeks, although 
some programs require specific reasons after 16 weeks. This “right to make 
fundamental personal decisions without interference from the state” is reflected in 
the 1988 R. v Morgentaler decision by the Supreme Court of Canada (R. v. 
Morgentaler 1988). The 1989 Report of the Law Reform Commission of Canada 
recommended that crimes against the fetus not apply to acts done before the twenty-
second week of pregnancy (Law Reform Commission of Canada 1989). Further, the 
1997 case of Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G., the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that 
The law of Canada does not recognize the unborn child as a legal 
person possessing rights. This is a general proposition applicable to all 
aspects of the law. Once a child is born, alive and viable, the law may 
recognize that its existence began before birth for certain limited 
purposes. But the only right recognized is that of the born person. Any 
right or interest the fetus may have remains inchoate and incomplete 
until the child’s birth (Winnipeg Child and Family Services 1997). 
 
Given the state of the law, the protection of fetuses from discrimination on the basis 
of sex is either unjustified, requires expansion of fetuses’ moral and legal status, or is 
in need of other justification. It will not be possible to sustain an argument against 
termination decisions if the only justification is harm done to the individual child as 
assessed after birth, unless based on harms incurred by the prenatal test procedure 
that manifest after birth when termination was not selected. 
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There have been proposals in Canada and elsewhere to prohibit prenatal testing for 
the purpose of sex-selection.3 These recommendations reflect the belief that 
discrimination on the basis of sex is ethically objectionable even in the case of 
prenatal testing and termination. 
 
Public Perceptions 
Early debates about the ethics of sex-selection occurred primarily in the U.S. and 
reflected wide controversy in moral and philosophical arguments, as well as the 
beliefs of clinicians and the general population. One prominent ethics commentator, 
John Fletcher, twice reversed his position in print (Fletcher 1980; Wertz and Fletcher 
1989). A study by Wertz and Fletcher found that 62% of U.S. physicians surveyed in 
1985 would either perform sex-selection or refer the patient, an increase from only 
1% in 1972 (Wertz and Fletcher 1989); a more recent international study of 37 
countries seems to confirm their earlier findings (Wertz and Fletcher 1998). In 
another American study, pre-conceptual sex-selection was acceptable to between 
25% and 33% of respondents, but this acceptance decreased to 11-13% when the 
method of sex-selection was abortion following prenatal testing (Dixon and Levy 
1985). Recent studies in the UK and Germany showed similarly low rates of 
acceptance in the general public (Dahl et al. 2003; Dahl et al. 2004). 
 
In terms of more general preferences for children of a particular sex, an early study 
of Florida college students found a 6 to 5 ratio of preference for male over female 
children (Markle and Nam 1971). Kolker and Burke’s review of the literature 
concluded that preference for sons over daughters was stronger among blacks than 
whites (Kolker and Burke 1994); among Catholics and Jews than Protestants; and 
with women sharing the same preference as men, and no difference based on 
feminist convictions (Coombs 1977; Gilroy and Steinbacher 1983). However, there is 
some evidence that this traditional sex preference may be reversing. One study of 
the sex preferences of pregnant women with one or more child (n=88), found a 
preference for a child of the opposite sex from existing children, with 68% of those 
having their first baby wanting a daughter (Walker 1992). Even though it may be the 
                                                 
3 In Canada, see (Canadian College of Medical Geneticists and the Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists of Canada 1993; Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 1993), while 
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case that neither sex is preferred, some commentators are nonetheless concerned 
about the effects of a preference for a son to precede a daughter (Clark 1985; 
Rothman 1986). 
 
Interestingly, the desire for a small family may outweigh the desire for a child of a 
specific sex. A sociological meta-analysis by Kolker and Burke suggests that sex-
selection to produce sons is influenced by cultural background. “In Western 
societies, most couples who seek abortion for sex selection are immigrants or 
temporary residents from Third World societies with a paramount emphasis on sons” 
(Kolker and Burke 1994, 147). They cite a Johns Hopkins University Hospital 
pediatrician, Haig Kazazian, Jr., as observing that amniocentesis for sex-selection 
was sought primarily by Asian and East Indian-born parents who were “desperate for 
a son after several daughters” (Kazazian 1980). Studies of developing countries 
describe neglect of female children and sex ratios favouring boys that are widening 
as a result of the introduction of amniocentesis, ultrasound and chorionic villus 
sampling (CVS) (Gargan 1991; Kristoff 1993; Kumm, Laland, and Feldman 1994; 
Patel 1991). 
 
Why Restrict Sex-Selection? 
Some commentators have used justice as a basis for their arguments that sex-
selection reflects a systematic bias against women and that for this reason choices 
preferring male offspring are unjustified. However, they claim that avoiding children 
with disabilities does not similarly take advantage of, or enforce discriminatory 
practices on people with disabilities (Buchanan et al. 2000). According to Buchanan 
et al.: 
We devalue disabilities because we value the opportunities and welfare 
of the people who have them. And it is because we value people, all 
people, that we care about limitations on their welfare and 
opportunities. We also know that disabilities as such diminish 
opportunities and welfare, even when they are not so severe that the 
lives of those who have them are not worth living, and even if those 
individuals do not literally suffer as a result of their disabilities 
(Buchanan et al. 2000, 278). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
in India, policies have been implemented, however unsuccessfully, to prohibit sex-selection (Mudur 
1999). 
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This of course, could be claimed as a justification for sex-selection in societies where 
being female is a severe burden. Consider, for example, the kind of oppression 
Afghan women lived with under rule by the Taliban. In such circumstances, very 
specific concerns about the welfare of children, and specifically female children, may 
well justify sex-selection independent of dedication to changing the socially 
oppressive regime. The point here is that it is the social circumstances that merit 
assessment in determining whether sex or disability are characteristics worthy of 
consideration by parents or women for the purposes of termination. 
 
Buchanan et al. have argued that prohibition of sex-selection is justified because it 
undermines the public good – the natural balance represented by the biologically 
determined sex ratio (Buchanan et al. 2000, 183). But is the “natural balance” they 
refer to an important public good? While it may be true that a change in the male to 
female ratio in a population might reduce the choice for reproductive partners, any 
type of reduction in the general population may reduce the absolute choice for 
partners; and in the Western world it is unclear that something close to a 1:1 ratio is 
necessary given patterns of reproductive and social choices.  
 
Perhaps it is because so much of our social resources over the last several decades 
have been visibly dedicated to making women equal in all dimensions of life, that we 
viscerally react to sex-selection as abhorrent. Even though some reasons that 
parents and professional cite to support sex-selection do not necessarily support 
sexism against women or explicitly oppose social reforms, the use of sex in 
determining quality of life or well-being is experienced as repugnant in this social 
context. But how can this description of ethical sentiment help us with the normative 
task of deciding what social policy is actually justified? 
 
The most promising basis for restricting sex-selection is that unjust oppressive social 
circumstances are required to make sex a liability, and that such circumstances do 
not exist in the Western world due to significant commitment of public resources to 
the reduction of such discrimination. For this public policy reason, it is justified to 
prohibit sex selection with confidence that we are not restricting parents’ exercise of 
their responsibilities related to their children’s future well-being. But does this 
genuinely make a defensible distinction between sex and disabling conditions? 
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Some disability activists and ethics commentators are concerned that the narrow 
prohibition on sex-selection implies an endorsement of all other prenatal testing and 
terminations (Kaplan 1993). 
 
Disability and Quality of Life 
Genetic testing and termination for Down syndrome is available and rather 
aggressively promoted in Canada and the U.S. (Bassett et al. 2000; Mennuti 1996). 
This situation is usually justified on the basis that the condition itself constitutes a 
severe limitation on the quality of life of the future child, the parents’ lives, and 
perhaps a drain on social resources. In order to avoid the eugenic implications of the 
concern about social resources (Nelkin and Lindee 1997), decisions about testing 
and termination are left to parental choice (Drake, Reid, and Marteau 1996). 
Activists, caregivers and some persons with DS argue that the social circumstances 
for persons with DS are oppressive, and that it is inappropriate to test and terminate 
for a condition where the poor quality of life is due to social circumstances, as in the 
case of sex-selection (Glover and Glover 1996). 
 
DS is a condition with a wide range of phenotypic expression. At one end, it can 
result in short lives with extremely limited quality; at the other end, it may present a 
very minor disability (Elkins and Brown 1995; Saenz 1999). However, with current 
testing methods it is impossible to determine prenatally the degree of expression that 
will be present in a child born with DS. Further, caregivers, activists and clinicians 
disagree when considering the quality of life of less extreme expressions of DS 
within current social conditions. 
 
Reasons to test and terminate for DS may therefore be based on the extreme 
symptoms being seen as incompatible with an acceptable quality of life, because the 
social circumstances of living with DS are assessed as intolerable, or both. Note that 
neither judgment implies a rejection of the quality of life of those living with DS under 
moderate symptoms or less oppressive social circumstances. Rather, both the 
ambiguity of the actual condition and the influence of social circumstances on the 
quality of life suggest that assessments of two kinds of threat to quality of life are 
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required.4 Thus under current circumstances, it will be permissible or at least non-
discriminatory to others with DS, to offer prenatal testing and termination. However, 
policy in this area will need to be based on evaluations of current and developing 
technologies, as the assessment may change if new technologies permit accurate 
prediction of the severity of the related trisomy, or there are improvements in the 
social circumstances for persons with DS and their caregivers. 
 
Recognizing the sufficient, although not necessary, role of social circumstances in 
the projected value of life lived with a particular condition has implications for the 
restriction of prenatal testing. There is a spectrum of conditions in which DS 
represents a sub-spectrum. Towards one end, there are conditions such as Lesch-
Nyhan syndrome,5 which is so debilitating that it can be considered negative 
independent of social issues. There are no social circumstances – short of cure or 
significant palliation – in which living with this condition would be tolerable, and it is 
therefore appropriate to offer testing and termination. Nevertheless, such decisions 
should be left to the autonomy of women or parents because testing and termination 
remain morally controversial as personal choices due to widely divergent views of 
the fetus’ moral status.6 At the other end of the spectrum would be conditions such 
as minor birth defects or carrier status for recessive traits, that would rarely if ever 
predict a quality of life of questionable value (due either to the condition or to social 
circumstances). Similarly, susceptibility for late adult onset conditions such as breast 
cancer or Huntington disease will, prior to onset of the conditions, constitute lives 
whose quality – as worth living – is uncontroversial. The task of evaluating which 
conditions are insufficient insults to quality of life to merit termination is unavoidably 
and inextricably tied to evaluating life within existing social circumstances. While it 
                                                 
4 Buchanan et al. distinguish between impairments and disabilities, where impairments are variations 
from species norms, but are disabling only “in one sort of social environment but not others” 
(Buchanan et al. 2000, 287). They then explain that the dominant cooperative framework of societies 
and economies define what is or is not disabled, and that those who are advantaged have a vested 
interest in preserving their advantage; choosing the cooperative framework is a matter for justice 
theory that precedes working out distributive justice (Buchanan et al. 2000, 294). 
5 Lesch-Nyhan syndrome is a rare and usually fatal X-linked genetic disorder of male children. The 
condition results from a complete deficiency of HPRT enzyme and the overproduction of uric acid 
throughout the body, and is characterized by spasticity, mental retardation, gout, and compulsive self-
mutilation (Thompson, McInnes, and Willard 1991). 
6 Issues of wrongful life are beyond the scope of this paper. We only mean to indicate that it is 
acceptable to test and terminate for Lesch-Nyhan syndrome. If an argument establishes that it is 
obligatory, it is of no relevance to the argument here, since Lesch-Nyhan is only an illustration of 
suffering that is least dependent on social circumstances. 
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may not be justified to restrict prenatal testing in order to force social change, the 
permissibility of prenatal testing for many conditions marks wide support for the 
assessment that the current social circumstances are discriminatory and significantly 
compromise the quality of life of those with the disabilities related to the condition. 
The negative evaluation of sex is solely dependent on social circumstances, so while 
testing and termination for the purposes of sex-selection is obviously not acceptable 
in many societies, it may be controversial elsewhere (House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee (UK) 2005; Savulescu 1999; Savulescu and Dahl 2000).  
 
However, it is not that sex-selection and disability discrimination through prenatal 
testing and termination are problematic because social circumstances justify 
assessments of poor quality of life; but that in societies that have dedicated 
resources to addressing the injustices of sexism, it is problematic to permit 
termination. Discriminatory social circumstances for persons with disabilities similarly 
justify parental concern about quality of life, and social investment in changing 
discriminatory circumstances would justify prohibition on testing once they are 
evaluated as having had considerable success. Prenatal tests for late onset 
disorders similarly identify conditions whose quality of life is not controversial, either 
due to the condition or discriminatory social circumstances. While these genetic 
conditions may be trivial in relation to quality of life prior to onset, neither fetal rights 
nor social sanction due to investment in changing socially unjust circumstances, may 
be sufficient grounds to warrant the restriction of parental autonomy. A more 
substantive argument – which is beyond the scope of this paper – about testing and 
termination for ‘trivial’ reasons may be required.  
 
The Aggregation Problem 
The social effects of individual prenatal decisions calculated as an aggregate may be 
considerable, and quite unintended by everyone involved in the individual decisions. 
What are the aggregate effects of individual decisions on the socially oppressive 
circumstances for those individuals living with disabilities? 
 
Deciding to terminate may undermine political pressure to oppose discriminatory 
structures or institutions by reducing the proportion of persons with disabilities and 
their caregivers who would advocate for change, and lead to increased pressure to 
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spend public resources on other social concerns that do not address the difficulties 
of those living with disabilities. Buchanan et al. argue that this claim is a sweeping 
generalization without empirical support (Buchanan et al. 2000, 267). Citing Kitcher, 
they suggest that one counter-example is the reduction in the incidence of 
Thalassemia in Greece (through carrier testing), which resulted in more resources 
being available to support the decreasing numbers of persons living with the disease 
(Kitcher 1996). Thus the view that reduced numbers of effected persons necessarily 
leads to diminished support is less plausible today than it may have been historically, 
although it is unclear how confidently we can generalize from this one example. 
Buchanan et al. also argue that people can have legitimate interests in not having 
disabilities, accepting that this argument only works when the intervention is 
termination and prevents the future person altogether. Moreover, those not disabled 
also have a legitimate interest in reducing the incidence of disability. 
 
Accepting individual responsibility for decisions to have children with disabling 
conditions may support the interpretation that responsibility for the support of 
disabled children is less a public responsibility and more personal. In the case of 
parents who decide to carry through with a pregnancy where the fetus has been 
determined to have DS, the parents may be seen as having accepted total 
responsibility for the costs of providing special education, medical care, and support 
for their child. Further, the aggregate effect of individuals succumbing to socially 
discriminatory pressures to terminate for negatively valued conditions may reinforce 
oppressive attitudes, structures and policies. Decisions to terminate may, for 
example, unintentionally imply a negative evaluation of the condition (and not the 
social circumstances), and thus encourage others to make similar decisions 
(Lippman 1989). 
  
The concerns about aggregation of individual decisions to test and terminate are 
serious. It is moreover imperative to consider how to take advantage of individual 
assessments that social circumstances are oppressive and in need of change. But 
we must also accept that while individual decisions in the biomedical context have 
political effects, this domain is nevertheless the wrong venue for fighting these 
political battles. The fact that social oppression occurs and is wrong does not mean 
that people do not have a right to try to protect those for whom they have direct 
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responsibility for quality of life. To preference the political mission, we would also 
have to accept that individual caregivers should not act heroically to help their family 
members, because in so doing they undermine the opportunity for political pressure. 
It is therefore unjustifiable to argue that the duty to work against oppressive social 
circumstances provides sufficient grounds for restricting opportunities to reduce 
suffering in particular cases. 
 
Conclusion 
To summarize, this paper dealt with four main questions: 1) Why does such a large 
proportion of our society react against sex-selection but not prenatal testing for 
conditions associated with minor disability? 2) Is it possible, without attributing moral 
status to fetuses, to justify prohibitions on sex-selection, including those for family 
completion or order of birth; 3) Is it possible that the justification can distinguish 
between sex-selection and disability testing? And 4) Can the result of distinguishing 
between sex-selection and disability testing lend moral force to the opposition of 
discrimination against persons with disabilities, and move toward justifying 
prohibitions on prenatal testing for disabilities? 
 
It is because so much of our social resources over the last several decades have 
been visibly dedicated to making women equal in all dimensions of life (recognizing 
that women have been, and still are systematically discriminated against), and that 
we believe we have sufficiently achieved this goal, that restricting parental choice for 
sex-selection is justified and is not deemed to prevent parents from making 
appropriate decisions related to the protection of their children’s future welfare. 
However, if we do not also prohibit prenatal testing and termination for conditions 
that severely disable, it is because these two factors are less influential when 
evaluating the social contributions to how a genetic condition might be disabling. The 
lack of social commitment to remedy the social circumstances that discriminate 
against persons with disabilities (and prevent them from having optimal lives), 
combines with the fact that parents reasonably anticipate that the disability will 
compromise their children’s welfare. It is therefore not justified to restrict prenatal 
testing and termination. Exceptions to this socially-contingent assessment are 
extreme conditions that are not amenable to improvements through social 
circumstances, such as Lesch-Nyhans disease, in which the lack of excellent 
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medical treatment is sufficient to provide a strong defence of parental decision-
making in the context of prenatal testing. 
 
These are a time and social-reform limited assessments that might change with 
society’s commitments and progress related to particular disabilities. Consider the 
implications that this may have for deafness. Commitment of social resources to 
assure an optimal life and relative success in improving the social circumstances of 
the lives of people who cannot hear (in part thanks to the politics of the deaf 
community) means that it is reasonable to claim that deafness is more similar to sex-
selection than DS, and thus we do not unreasonably restrict parent’s decisions on 
behalf of their children’s future welfare by denying testing and termination for 
deafness. This would also mean that people in the deaf community would not be 
permitted to test prenatally and terminate to assure that their children are not born 
hearing. 
 
With respect to DS, activists argue that social conditions have a devastating effect 
on the quality of life for some persons with DS, providing prima facie evidence that 
society has not committed sufficient resources and therefore not made enough 
progress for there to be symmetry with sex-selection. We have neither the social 
commitment to making life with DS as optimal as possible, nor sufficient success in 
ameliorating the discriminatory social circumstances, to justify the claim that a 
prohibition on prenatal testing would not restrict parents exercise of their 
responsibility to seek their children’s best interests. Even if we did commit social 
resources and make considerable progress, the inability of current tests to 
distinguish between mild and extreme forms of disability might prevent us from 
justifying the prohibition. 
 
In order to challenge socially oppressive environments while also respecting 
individual autonomy and responsibilities, concentration of effort will need to be at the 
broader institutional and political levels. Specifically, it is critical that we engage 
stakeholders (i.e., persons with disabilities and caregivers) in the process of 
assessing the influence of social conditions on quality of life for genetic and other 
health conditions. This falls under a broader program of the morality of inclusion 
discussed by Buchanan et al (Buchanan et al. 2000, 260-264).  
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Collaboration between persons with disabilities, their supporters and the professional 
community might result in better information about the realities of living with 
prenatally detectable conditions (Kaplan 1993). This approach explicitly accepts that 
there is a struggle to appropriately recognize persons with disabilities. But most 
importantly, it emphasizes that lack of institutional and social support for persons 
with disabilities is a significant influence on persons with disabilities and their 
caregivers as well as those contemplating the use of prenatal testing for disability. It 
is unrealistic to expect geneticists and counsellors to become disabilities activists, 
but their engagement with the disabilities “community” can enrich the support they 
provide to parents (Dunne and Warren 1998). The trust of persons with disabilities 
and their supporters’ in health care institutions and professionals has been eroded 
by this dispute. Collaboration on how to respond is one way of rebuilding that trust. 
 
Further, an open discussion between the various stakeholders can help determine 
for which conditions parents should have access to prenatal testing and which social 
circumstances would or would not support a good quality of life. But this evaluation 
should not be static or lead progressively to the inclusion of more conditions. Rather, 
improved ethical perception and progress in social reform will be marked by the 
extent to which prenatal testing and termination for disabling conditions, like sex-
selection, become less common or are even prohibited because they are better 
supported by reduction in discrimination. Prohibiting sex-selection is justifiable in the 
majority of societies that have made significant investments of public resources to 
reduce or eliminate discrimination, and where it is reasonable to claim that being 
female does not severely compromise parents’ responsibilities related to their 
children’s quality of life. Permitting prenatal testing for DS is less discriminatory 
because it seems reasonable for parents to assess whether life with the condition in 
their society is a significant compromise. It is vital that the growing acceptance of a 
prohibition on sex-selection not impair recognition of other areas of discrimination, 
but rather serve as the basis for progressive moral perception and for extending 
social change and evaluation of genetic policy related to disabilities. 
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